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ABSTRACT
Community-based question answering (CQA) services are
facing key challenges to motivate domain experts to provide
timely answers. Recently, CQA services are exploring new in-
centive models to engage experts and celebrities by allowing
them to set a price on their answers. In this paper, we per-
form a data-driven analysis on two emerging payment-based
CQA systems: Fenda (China) and Whale (US). By analyz-
ing a large dataset of 220K questions (worth 1 million USD
collectively), we examine how monetary incentives affect dif-
ferent players in the system. We find that, while monetary
incentive enables quick answers from experts, it also drives
certain users to aggressively game the system for profits. In
addition, in this supplier-driven marketplace, users need to
proactively adjust their price to make profits. Famous people
are unwilling to lower their price, which in turn hurts their in-
come and engagement over time. Finally, we discuss the key
implications to future CQA design.
INTRODUCTION
The success of community based question answering (CQA)
services depends on high-quality content from users, partic-
ularly from domain experts. With highly engaging experts,
services like Quora and StackOverflow attract hundreds of
millions of visitors worldwide [41]. However, for most CQA
systems, domain experts are answering questions voluntarily
for free. As the question volume keeps growing, it becomes
difficult to draw experts’ attention to a particular question, let
alone getting answers on-demand [33].
To motivate experts, one possible direction is to introduce
monetary incentives [10]. Recently, Quora started a beta test
on “knowledge prize”, which allows users to put cash re-
wards on their questions.While Quora is slowly accumulating
interested users (less than 10 paid answers per month), an-
other payment-based service called Fenda1 is rising quickly
in China. Fenda is a social network app that connects users to
well-known domain experts and celebrities to ask questions
with payments. Launched in May 2016, Fenda quickly gained
10 million registered users, 500K paid questions, and 2 mil-
lion US dollar revenue in just two months [39].
Fenda leads a new wave of payment-based CQA services that
socially engage users with real-world domain experts. Similar
services are emerging in China (Zhihu, Weibo QA) and US
(Whale, Campfire.fm). The involvement of verified experts
differs them from earlier payment-based CQA services (most
defunct now) that were built on an anonymous crowd such as
Mahalo Answers and ChaCha [2, 11, 20].
1http://fd.zaih.com/fenda
So, is monetary incentive the solution to strong expert engage-
ment in CQA systems? How does monetary incentive affect
the behavior of different players in the system and their over-
time engagement? These questions are critical for payment-
based CQA design, and platforms like Fenda provide a unique
opportunity to study them. First, Fenda is the first supplier-
driven CQA marketplace, where answerers (experts) set their
own price. Users ask questions to a specific person instead
of an anonymous crowd using payments. In addition, Fenda’s
incentive model not only rewards answerers, but also those
who ask good questions. After a question is answered, other
users need to pay a small amount ($0.14) to listen to the an-
swer. This money is split evenly between the asker and the
answerer (Figure 1). A good question may attract enough lis-
teners to compensate the initial question fee.
In this paper, we describe our experience and findings in an ef-
fort to understand the impact of monetary incentives on CQA
systems, through a detailed measurement of Fenda (China)
and a similar system Whale2 (US). We collected a dataset of
88,540 users and 212,082 answers from Fenda (two months
in 2016), and 1,419 users and 9,199 answers from Whale
(6 months during 2016–2017), involving more than 1 mil-
lion USD transactions. Given the drastic differences between
payment-based CQA systems and mainstream systems such
as Quora and StackOverflow, our study has significant impli-
cations for the future direction of CQA design.
Our study has a number of key findings.
• First, we seek to understand the effectiveness of monetary
incentives to engage domain experts. Our result shows this
attempt is successful. Both Fenda and Whale attract a small
group of high-profile experts and celebrities who make sig-
nificant contributions to the CQA community. For example,
Fenda experts count for 0.5% of the user population, but
have contributed a quarter of all answers and driven nearly
half of the financial revenue.
• Second, we analyze how the incentive model affects user be-
havior, and find a mixed effect. On the positive side, mon-
etary incentive enables quick answers (average delay 10–
23 hours) and motivates users to ask good questions (40%
of the Fenda questions successfully drew enough interested
audience to cover the askers’ cost). However, we did find
a small number of manipulative users including “bounty
hunters” who aggressively asked questions to make money
from listeners, and “collusive users” who work together to
manipulate their perceived popularity.
2https://askwhale.com/
• Third, we study the dynamics between money and user en-
gagement over time. In a supplier-driven CQA marketplace,
users need to set the price of their answers. We find differ-
ent pricing strategies of users have distinct impacts on their
own engagement level. Users who proactively adjust their
price are more likely to increase income and engagement
level. Certain highly famous people, however, are unwilling
to lower their price, which in turn hurts their income and
social engagement.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical study
on supplier-driven CQA marketplaces. Our study provides
practical guidelines for other arising payment-based CQA ser-
vices (Quora knowledge prize, Zhihu, Campfire.fm) and re-
veals key implications for future CQA system design. We be-
lieve this is a first step towards understanding the economy of
community-based knowledge sharing.
RELATED WORK
Community Based Question Answering (CQA). In recent
years, researchers have studied CQA services from various
aspects [32]. Early studies have focused on identifying do-
main experts in a CQA community [26, 8] and routing user
questions to the right experts [21, 27]. Other works focused
on assessing the quality of existing questions and answers [29,
40, 30, 35, 1, 9, 34] and detecting low quality (or even abu-
sive) content [16]. Finally, researchers also studied Q&A ac-
tivities in online social networks [25, 7]. As the sizes of CQA
systems rapidly grow, it becomes challenging to engage with
experts for timely and high-quality answers [33].
User Motivations in CQA. A successful CAQ system re-
quires active and sustainable user participations. Prior works
have summarized three main user motivations to answer ques-
tions online: “intrinsic”, “social” and “extrinsic” [13]. Intrin-
sic motivation refers to the psychic reward (e.g., enjoyment)
that users gain through helping others [42, 24]. Social factors
refer to the benefits of social interactions, e.g., gaining respect
and enhancing reputation. Intrinsic and social factors are criti-
cal incentives for non-payment based CQA services [13]. Ex-
trinsic factors refer to money and virtual rewards (e.g., badges
and credit points) [24, 6].
Monetary incentive is an extrinsic factor implemented in ear-
lier payment-based CQA services such as Google Answers,
Mahalo, ChaCha and Jisiklog [2, 11, 20, 19]. Most of them
are defunct. Compared with Fenda and Whale, these systems
focus on building a CQA market on an anonymous crowd,
instead of a social network that engages real-world experts.
Users are primarily driven by financial incentives without a
strong sense of community [20, 10]. This is concerning since
research shows monetary incentive plays an important role in
getting users started in CQA, but it is the social factors that
contribute to the persistent participation [28].
Researchers have studied the impact of monetary incentives
but the conclusions vary. Some researchers find that monetary
incentives improves the answer quality [9] and response rate
in social Q&A [43]. Others suggest that payments merely re-
duce the response delay but have no significant impact on the
answer quality [2, 12, 11]. Studies also show that payment-
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Figure 1. Fenda QA system: a user can ask another user a question by
paying her (price set by the answerer). Other users need to pay a small
amount to listen to the answer ($0.14), which will be split evenly between
the asker and the answerer. Fenda charges 10% commission fee.
based Q&A can reduce low-quality questions since users are
more selective regarding what to ask [10, 11].
Crowdsourcing Marketplace. Broadly speaking, a payment-
based CQA service is a specialized crowdsourcing market-
place. Today, most crowdsourcing marketplaces (e.g. Me-
chanical Turk) are “customer-driven” where customers post
their tasks and set the task price [17]. In such marketplaces,
pricing strategy can affect the work quality and response
time [15, 23, 14]. Fenda and Whale, on the other hand, rep-
resent “supplier-driven”marketplaces where experts (the sup-
pliers) get to set the price for their answers (products). Part of
our analysis is to understand users’ pricing strategies and its
impact on their Q&A activities and financial income.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHOD
Systems like Fenda andWhale are leading the way to socially
engage with real-world experts for question answering. The
introduction of monetary incentives makes user interactions
even more complex. If not carefully designed, monetary in-
centives can lead the systems down to the wrong path with
users chasing financial profits and losing engagement in the
long run. In this paper, we use Fenda as the primary platform
to investigate how monetary incentives impact the user be-
havior and engagement-level in CQA systems. We also in-
clude Whale (a younger and smaller system) in our analysis
for comparison and validation purposes.
We choose Fenda and Whale for two main reasons. First,
Fenda andWhale represent the first supplier-drivenCQAmar-
ketplaces with a unique incentive model to motivate both
question askers and respondents. Second, the system (Fenda
in particular) has received an initial success with a significant
volume of data and revenue flow. We aim to understand the
reasons behind their success and potential problems moving
forward, which will benefit future CQA design. We did not
include Quora since Quora hasn’t accumulated sufficient paid
content (e.g.,< 10 paid answers per month).
Background of Fenda. Fenda is a payment-basedQ&A app in
China, which connects users in a Twitter-like social network.
Launched in May 2016, Fenda quickly gained 10 million reg-
istered users and over 2 million US dollars worth of questions
answers in the first two months [39, 18].
As shown in Figure 1, Fenda has a unique monetary incentive
model to reward both question askers and answerers. A user
(asker) can ask another user (answerer) a question by paying
the price set by the answerer. The answerer then responds
over the phone by recording a 1-minute audio message. If
the answerer doesn’t respond within 48 hours, the payment
will be refunded. Any other user on Fenda can listen to the
answer by paying a fixed amount of 1 Chinese Yuan ($0.14),
and it will be split evenly between the asker and answerer. A
good question may attract enough listeners to compensate the
initial cost for the asker. Users set the price for their answers
and can change the price anytime. Fenda charges 10% of the
money made by any user.
There are two types of users on Fenda: verified real-world
experts (e.g., doctors, entrepreneurs, movie stars) and normal
users. There is an expert list that contains all the experts that
have been verified and categorized by the Fenda administra-
tors. Users can browse questions from the social news feed or
from the public stream of popular answers (a small sample).
To promote user engagement, Fenda selects 2-4 answers daily
on the public stream for free-listening for a limited time.
Background of Whale. Whale is a highly similar system
launched in the US in September 2016. There are a few dif-
ferences: First, Whale users record video (instead of audio)
as their answers. Second, Whale has free questions and paid
questions. For paid questions, it is also the answerer that
sets the price, but Whale takes a higher cut (20%) from the
question fee. Third, listeners use the virtual currency “whale
coins” to watch the paid answers. Users can receive a few
free coins from the platform after logging-in each day, and
they may also purchase paid coins in bulks ($0.29 – $0.32
per coin). Only when a listener uses paid coins to unlock a
question will the asker and answerer receive the extra pay-
ment ($0.099 each).
Our Questions. In the following, we use Fenda andWhale as
the platform to analyze how monetary incentives impact user
behavior and their engagement-level. We take a data-driven
approach to answer the following key questions.
• First, as an expert-driven CQA system, to what extent does
the system rely on experts to generate content and revenue?
What types of experts are more likely to make a profit?
• Second, how does the monetary incentive affect the question
answering process? Does money truly enable on-demand
question answering from experts? Can users make money
by asking (good) questions? Will monetary incentives en-
courage users to game the system for profits?
• Third, in this supplier-driven market, how do users set and
dynamically adjust the price of their answers? How does the
pricing strategy affect their income and engagement-level
over time?
DATA COLLECTION
We start by collecting a large dataset from Fenda and Whale
through their mobile APIs. Our data collection focused on
user profiles, which contained a full list of historical questions
answered by the user. To obtain a large set of active users,
Service Date # of # of # of # of
Name (2016-2017) Questions Users Askers Answerers
Fenda 5/12/16 – 7/27/16 212,082 88,540 85,510 15,529
Whale 9/07/16 – 3/08/17 9,199 1,419 1,371 656
Table 1. Summary of Fenda and Whale dataset.
we explored different options (some of which did not work).
First, we find that there is no centralized list to crawl all reg-
istered users. Second, a user’s follower list is not public (only
the total number is visible), and thus social graph crawling is
not feasible. To these ends, we started our crawling from the
expert list. For each expert, we collected their answered ques-
tions and the askers of those questions. Then we collected the
askers’ profiles to get their answered question list and extract
new askers. We repeated this process until no new users ap-
peared. In this way, we collected a large set of active users
who asked or answered at least one question.3
We collected data from Fenda in July 2016. The dataset con-
tains 88,540 user profiles and 212,082 question-answer pairs
ranging from May 12 to July 27, 2016. Each question is char-
acterized by the asker’s userID, question text, a timestamp,
question price, and the number of listeners. Each answer is
characterized by the answerer’s userID, a length of the au-
dio and a timestamp. UserIDs in our dataset have been fully
anonymized. We briefly estimated the coverage of the Fenda
dataset. Fenda announced that they had 500,000 answers as
of June 27, 2016 [39]. Up to the same date, our dataset cov-
ers 155,716 answers (about 31%). For Whale, we collected
1,419 user profiles and 9,199 question-answer pairs (1114
paid questions and 8085 free questions) from September 7,
2016 to March 8, 2017. It is difficult to estimate the coverage
of the Whale dataset since there is no public statistics on the
Whale user population. Table 1 shows a summary of our data.
ENGAGING WITH DOMAIN EXPERTS
As a CQA system driven by real-world experts, we first ex-
plore the roles and impact of domain experts in the system.
More specifically, we examine the contributions of domain
experts to the community in terms of generating content and
driving financial revenue.
Fenda maintains a list of verified experts and celebrities, who
are typically already well-known in their respective domains.
As of the time of data collection, there were 4370 verified
experts classified into 44 categories by Fenda administrators.
We refer these 4,370 users as experts and the rest 84,170 users
as normal users. Whale has a similar expert list (118 experts),
and we refer the rest 1301 Whale users as normal users.
Question Answering
The small group of experts have contributed to a significant
portion of the answers. Out of the 212K answers in the Fenda
dataset, 171K (81%) are from experts. Using this dataset, we
can briefly estimate the experts’ contribution in the context
of the entire network. On June 27 2016, Fenda officially an-
nounced total 500K answers and 10 million users [39]. Up to
the same date, our dataset shows the 4,370 experts (0.44%
of the population) have contributed 122K answers (24.4%
of total answers). Individually, experts in Fenda (FD) also
3Our study has received IRB approval: protocol # 16-1143.
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Figure 5. # of Listeners per answer.
Fenda Whale
Category Tot. Income Experts Category Tot. Income Experts
Health $123K (12%) 204 Startups $1.9K (72%) 63
Career $81K (8%) 222 Tech $1.8K (72%) 61
Business $81K (8%) 108 Entertain. $877 (33%) 2
Relation. $73K (7%) 90 Snapchat $869 (33%) 1
Movies $52K (5%) 84 Motorcycle $869 (33%) 1
Entertain. $52K (5%) 51 Marketing $471 (18%) 20
Academia $49K (5%) 64 Design $383 (14%) 15
Media $45K (5%) 138 Travel $203 (8%) 18
Real Estate $43K (4%) 28 Fitness $191 (7%) 19
Education $39K (4%) 174 Finance $141 (5%) 8
Table 2. Top 10 expert categories with highest total earnings.
answered significantly more questions than normal users as
shown in Figure 2. Whale (WH) has a similar situation where
118 experts (8% of users) have contributed 4,967 answers
(54% of answers).
Money
Experts play an important role in driving revenue. In total, the
questions in the Fenda dataset were worth $1,169,994 includ-
ing payments from askers and listeners.4 Experts’ answers
generated $1,106,561, counting for a dominating 95% of to-
tal revenue in our dataset. To gauge experts’ contribution in
the context of the entire network, we again performed an es-
timation: Fenda reached 2 million revenue as of June 27 in
2016 [39]. Up to this same date (June 27), expert answers
in our dataset have attracted $909,876, counting for a signif-
icant 45% of the 2 million revenue. Figure 4 and Figure 5
show that, on average, experts charge higher ($2.9 vs. $1.0)
and draw more listeners (27 vs. 5) than normal users.
Individually, experts also make more money than normal
users. Figure 3 shows the total income for users who an-
swered at least one question. On Fenda, 50% of experts made
more than $23, while a small group of experts (5%) made
more than $1000. The highest earning is $33,130 by Sicong
Wang, a businessman and the son of a Chinese billionaire. He
answered 31 questions related to gossip and investment. He
charged $500 for each of his answers, which drew 9484 lis-
teners ($664 extra earning) per answer on average.
On Whale, experts are also the major contributors to the
revenue flow. The total collected questions on Whale worth
$2,309 and experts contributed to $2,028 (89%). Compared
with Fenda (FD), Whale (WH) users earned significantly less
money (Figure 3). A possible reason, as shown in Figure 4, is
that most users (more than 80%) provide answers for free.
4We convert Chinese Yuan to US dollar based on $1 = 6.9 Yuan.
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Expert Categories
Experts of different categories have distinct earning patterns.
Table 2 shows the top 10 categories ranked by the total earn-
ings per category. In Fenda, the most popular experts are re-
lated to professional consulting. The top category is health,
followed by career, business, and relationship. In
the health category, many experts are real-world physi-
cians and pediatricians. They give Fenda users medical ad-
vice on various (non-life-threatening) issues such as headache
and flu with the expense of several dollars. Other popular cat-
egories such as movies and entertainments contain
questions to celebrities about their insider experience, gossip
and opinions on trending events.
Whale, on the other hand, has fewer experts. The highest
earning experts are related to startups and technology.
Note that Whale experts can belong to multiple categories, so
the percentage of accumulated income exceeds 100%.
In Figure 6, we further illustrate the distinct earning patterns
of Fenda experts.We omit the result forWhale due to its short
expert list. For each category, we compute the average price
and the number of answers per expert. The red lines repre-
sent the average values across all experts, which divide them
into 4 sections. Experts in health, entertainment,
relationship, and real estate often charge high
and answer many questions. These experts are among the top-
earning groups; Experts in business set the price high but
don’t answer many questions; Less-serious categories such
as funny and comics have fewer and less expensive ques-
tions. Finally, digital represents experts who answer lots
of questions with a low price. The results also reflect the dif-
ferent user perceived values for different domain knowledge.
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Behavior Metric Fenda Whale
# Followers 0.53* 0.30*
Avg. # Listeners 0.65* 0.08*
# Questions Answered 0.04* 0.14*
Avg. Response Time 0.01 -0.07
Table 3. Pearson correlation between a user’s answer price and key be-
havior metrics. * indicates significant correlation with p < 0.05.
IMPACT OF MONETARY INCENTIVES
So far we show that Fenda and Whale are highly dependent
on domain experts’ contribution. Then the question is how to
motivate experts to deliver timely and high-quality answers.
In this section, we perform extensive analysis on themonetary
incentivemodel to understand its impact on user behavior. No-
ticeably, Fenda andWhale use money to reward both question
answerers and askers. To this end, we first analyze answer-
ers to understand how they price their answers, and whether
payments lead to on-demand responses. Second, we focus on
askers analyzing whether and how users make money by ask-
ing the right questions. Finally, we seek to identify abnormal
users such as “bounty hunters” who aggressively or strategi-
cally game the system for profits.
Answerers
To motivate users (particularly domain experts), both Fenda
and Whale allow users to determine the price for their an-
swers. In the following, we investigate how money affects the
way users answer questions. Particularly, we examine if mon-
etary incentives truly enable on-demand quick answers.
Setting the Answer Price. To understand how users set a price
for their answers, we calculate the Pearson correlation [31] be-
tween a user’s price and different behaviormetrics. In Table 3,
we observe that the price has positive and significant correla-
tions with the number of followers, listeners, and answered
questions. A possible explanation is that users with many fol-
lowers and listeners are real-world celebrities who have the
confidence to set a higher price. The higher price may also
motivate them to answer more questions. Note that these are
correlation results, which do not reflect causality.
Surprisingly, there is no significant correlation between price
and response time (for both Fenda and Whale). This is differ-
ent from existing results on customer-driven CQA markets,
where an asker can use a higher payment to collect answers
more quickly [15, 23, 11].
Answering On-demand? We further examine the response
time to see if monetary incentives truly enable answering
questions on-demand. As shown in Figure 7, answers arrive
Service Name Avg. Resp. Payment Crowdsourcing
Time (hr) Based? or Targeted?
Yahoo Answers 8.25 N Crowdsourcing
Fenda 10.4 Y Targeted
Whale 23.6 Y Targeted
Google Answers 36.9 Y Crowdsourcing
Stack Overflow 58.0 N Crowdsourcing
Table 4. Average response time of the first answer (in hours). We com-
pare Fenda and Whale with different CQA sites including Yahoo An-
swers [38], Google Answers [3] and StackOverflow [22].
fast on Fenda: 33% of answers arrived within an hour and
85% arrived within a day. Note that there is a clear cut-off
at 48 hours. This is the time when un-answered questions
will be refunded, which motivates users to answer questions
quickly. After 48 hours, users can still answer those questions
for free. We find that only 0.7% of the answers arrived after
the deadline, but we cannot estimate how many questions re-
main unanswered due to the lack of related data. Despite the
high price charged by experts, experts respond slower than
normal users.
The result for Whale is very similar. Figure 7 shows that
for paid questions, 50%–70% of answers arrived within a
day and normal users respond faster than experts. Compar-
ing to Fenda, Whale has a slightly longer delay possibly be-
cause recording a video incurs more overhead than recording
a voice message.
We then compare Fenda and Whale with other CQA sys-
tems in Table 4. The response delay in Fenda and Whale
is shorter than that of Google Answers and StackOverflow,
but longer than that of Yahoo Answers. As payment-based
systems, Fenda/Whale beats Google Answers probably be-
cause Fenda/Whale only asks for a short audio/video, while
Google Answers require lengthy text. Compared to Yahoo
Answers, we believe it is the crowdsourcing factor that plays
the role. Systems like Yahoo Answers crowdsource questions
to a whole community where anyone could deliver the answer.
Instead, Fenda/Whale’s question is targeted to a specific user,
which may lead to a longer delay even with payments.
Askers
Fenda and Whale implement the first monetary incentive
model to reward users for asking good questions.More specif-
ically, once a user’s question gets answered, this user (the
question asker) can earn a small amount of money from peo-
ple who want to listen to the answer. This model, if executed
as designed, should motivate users to contribute high-quality
questions for the community.
Fenda Whale
Behavior Askers Askers p Askers Askers p
Metric $>0 $≤0 $>0 $≤0
Avg. Followers 2155.5 3758.5 * 750.2 790.0
Avg. Listeners 55.2 16.9 * 28.3 38.1 *
Avg. Price 1.58 4.58 * 0.0 0.3 *
Avg. Questions 3.99 1.86 * 5.4 6.6
Table 5. Two sample t-test compares the behavior metrics for askers with
positive income and those with negative income. * indicates the differ-
ences between the two types of askers are significant with p < 0.05.
Can Askers Make Money? For each question, the question
asker’s income is half of listeners’ payments, with Fenda’s
commission fee and initial question fee deducted. Our result
shows that Fenda askers are motivated to ask good questions
that attract broad interests. As shown in Figure 8, out of all
questions, 40% have successfully attracted enough listeners
to return a positive profit to the asker. For individual askers,
Figure 9 shows 40% of them have a positive total income.
However, for Whale, the vast majority of askers did not earn
money. Part of the reason is most people only ask free ques-
tions. More importantly, Whale gives away free coins every
day to motivate users to login. If a listener uses free coins
(instead of paid coins), the asker will not receive any money.
How Do Askers Make Money? To understand why certain
users make money (and others don’t), we compare askers who
have positive income with those with negative income in Ta-
ble 5. Specifically, we examine to whom they ask questions
(i.e., the number followers and listeners of the answerer), av-
erage question price, and total questions asked. A two-sample
t-Test [31] shows the significance of the differences between
the two groups of askers.
On Fenda, users of positive income are more likely send ques-
tions to people who have more listeners and charge less. The
counter-intuitive result is the number of followers: asking peo-
ple with more followers is more likely to lose money. A pos-
sible explanation is the inherent correlation between a user’s
number of followers and her answer price — famous peo-
ple would charge higher and the money from listeners can-
not cover the initial cost. We also observe that askers with
a higher income often asked more questions. Again, correla-
tion does not reflect causality: it is possible that the positive
income motivates users to ask more questions, or people who
asked more questions get more experienced in earning money.
It is hard to interpret the Whale results in Table 5 since only
a very small of fraction of askers have a positive income (Fig-
ure 9). Noticeably, askers with positive income exclusively
ask free questions (average price = 0).
Abnormal Users
Next, we examine suspicious users in the CQA market who
seek to game the system for financial profits.
Bounty Hunters. We first focus on askers who aggressively
ask questions to gain profits (or “bounty hunters”). Our intu-
ition is that those users would ask a lot of questions, particular
to experts. To identify potential bounty hunters in Fenda, we
examine outliers in Figure 10, which is a scatter plot for the
number of questions a user asked versus the ratio of questions
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Figure 10. Total # of questions of each asker vs. the ratio of questions to
experts in Fenda. Blue dots (red crosses) represent askers with positive
(negative) total income. The figure is better viewed in color.
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Figure 11. Total # of questions of each answerer vs. Maximum # of ques-
tions asked by the same person. Dots in the circled area are likely the
collusive users. We select three example users for case studies.
to experts. We find clear outliers at the right side (e.g., users
with >100 questions). Most of these users end up with posi-
tive income. They asked way more questions than other users
(who asked 2.27 questions on average), and exclusively inter-
act with experts (ratio of expert questions is close to 1). The
most extreme example is a user who asked more than 1300
questions in two months, with 95% of questions to experts.
This user earned $194.20, which is much higher than the av-
erage income of askers (-$1.95).
To further examine these outliers, we select askers who asked
more than 100 questions. This gives us 111 users who count
for 0.13% of askers in our dataset but aggressively asked 11%
of the questions. In addition, they seem to carefully target
experts who charge a lower price ($0.80 per answer) but still
draw significant listeners (15.5 per answer). As a comparison,
the rest of the experts on average charge $2.49 and draw 23.0
listeners per answer.
We performed the same analysis on Whale and did not find
such outlier users because most askers onWhale did not make
a positive profit (Figure 9). We omit the results for brevity.
Collusive Users. In addition to bounty hunters, there could
be “collusive” users who work together to make money. For
example, an asker may collude with an answerer by asking
many questions (with an extremely low price) to create the
illusion that the answerer is very popular. Then both the asker
and the answerer can make money from the listeners of these
questions. This collusion may be even conducted by a single
attacker who controlled both the asker and answerer accounts.
To identify collusive users, we focus on answerers whose
questions are primarily asked by the same user. Figure 11
shows a scatter plot for the number of questions a user an-
swered versus the maximum number of these questions asked
by the same person. Users that are close to the diagonal are
suspicious. Take the two marked dots in Figure 11(a) for ex-
ample, user1 answered 435 questions and 309 (71%) were
asked by the same asker. We notice that this asker did not
ask any other users any questions. The questions between
these two users charge $0.16 each, which is much lower than
user1’s other questions ($0.25 on average). By using a lower
price for collusion, the two users can minimize their loss —
the 10% commission fee to Fenda. In this way, user1 earned
$689.9 in total and this asker also earned $244 from the listen-
ers. The second example follows the same pattern. 120 out of
274 questions that user2 answered were from the same asker
(who only asked 128 questions in total). This leads to finan-
cial returns for both user2 ($116.42) and the asker ($27.5).
Figure 11(b) shows the result of Whale. The example user
(user3) answered 31 questions, 18 of which were from the
same asker. This asker only asked these 18 questions and all
18 questions were free of charge. This is likely an attempt to
boost user3’s popularity.
Discussion. Our analysis shows that monetary incentives
did foster manipulative behavior. On the positive side, these
users (bounty hunters or collusive users) are actually work-
ing hard to come up with interesting questions in order to
earn money from listeners. On the negative side, such behav-
ior has a disruptive impact to the marketplace. For example,
bounty hunters are injecting a large volume of questions to
experts. The large volume of questions act as spam to experts,
blocking other users’ chance to get the experts’ attention. For
collusive behavior, it creates a fake perception of popularity,
which could mislead listeners to making the wrong spending.
In addition, collusion also introduces unfairness to other hon-
est experts, which is likely to hurt the sustainability of the
community in the long run.
Our analysis focuses on the most likely attacks, and there
could be other types of attacks. For example, answerers and
listeners may also collude to bootstrap the “listening count”
for a question and lure innocent users to pay for listening.
However, we don’t have the related data (e.g., listeners’ IDs)
to analyze this attack.
DYNAMIC PRICING AND USER ENGAGEMENT
As supplier-driven marketplaces, Fenda and Whale allow
users to set the price for their answers. How users set this
price may affect their financial income and their interaction
with other users. In this section, we turn to the dynamic as-
pect to analyze how users adjust their answer prices over time
and how different pricing strategies affect their engagement
level. Understanding this question is critical since keeping
users (particularly experts) engaged is the key to building a
sustainable CQA service.
In the following, we first identify common pricing strategies
by applying unsupervised clustering on users’ traces of price
change. Then we analyze the identified clusters to understand
what type of users they represent, and how their engagement-
level changes over time.
id Feature Name Feature Description
1 Price Change Freq. # of price change / # answers
2 Price Up Freq. # price up / # answers
3 Price Down Freq. # price down / # answers
4 Price Up - Down (# price up - # price down) / # answers
5 Price Up Magnitude Average percentage of price increase
6 Pirce Down Magnitude Average percentage of price decrease
7 Consecut. Same Price Max # consecutive same price / # answers
8 Consecut, Price Up Max # consecutive price up / # answers
9 Consecut. Price Down Max # consecutive price down / # answers
Table 6. A list of features for price change dynamics.
Identifying Distinct Pricing Strategies
To characterize users’ dynamic price change, we construct a
list of features to group users with similar price change pat-
terns.
Key Features. For each user, we model their price change
as a sequence of events. Given user i, our dataset contains the
complete list of her answers and the price for each answer. We
use Pi to denote user i’s price sequencePi = [pi,1, pi,2, ..., pi,Ni ]
where Ni is the total number of answers of user i. A price
change event happens when pi, j−1 , pi, j for any j ∈ [2,Ni].
We denote the price change sequence asCi = [ci,1,ci,2, ...ci,Mi ]
where Mi is a number of times for price change and ci, j is a
price change event (price-up, price-down, or same-price).
Table 6 list our 9 features: the overall frequency of price
change (i.e., Mi
Ni
), a frequency for price-up and price-down,
and the frequency difference between price-up and down. In
addition, we consider the average price change magnitude for
price-up and price-down events. Finally, we consider the max-
imum number of consecutive events of same-price, price-up
and price-down in the sequence.
User Clustering. Based on these features, we then cluster
similar users into groups. First, we compute the pair-wise
Euclidean distance between users based on their feature vec-
tors. This produces a fully connected similarity graph [37]
where each node is a user and edges are weighted by distance.
Then, we apply hierarchical clustering algorithm [4] to de-
tect groups of users with similar price change patterns. We
choose hierarchical clustering for two reasons: 1) It does not
pre-define the number of clusters. 2) It is deterministic and
the clustering result does not depend on the initial seeding.
To determine the number of clusters, we use modularity, a
well-known metric to measure clustering quality [4]. High
modularity means users are more densely connected within
each cluster than to the rest of the users. We choose the num-
ber of clusters that yields the highest modularity.
For this analysis, we only consider users who have answered
enough questions (more than 10). Otherwise, discussing their
dynamic price change and engagement would be less mean-
ingful. On Fenda, this filtering produces 2094 users who
have answered 171,322 questions (85% of all questions). On
Whale, however, only 68 users meet the criteria. These users
answered 986 paid questions (89% of all paid questions). We
will primarily focus on Fenda, and also include Whale’s re-
sults for completeness.
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Figure 12. The distribution of top 4 features for the 3 clusters in Fenda
and Whale. We depict each distribution with box plot quantiles (5%,
25%, 50%, 75%, 95%). The detailed feature description is in Table 6.
Clustering Results
Our method produces 3 clusters for both Fenda (modularity
0.59) and Whale (modularity 0.62). To understand the pric-
ing strategy of each cluster, we plot their feature value distri-
butions in Figure 12. Due to space limitation, we plot 4 (out of
9) most distinguishing features that have the largest variance
among the 3 clusters selected by Chi-Squared statistic [31].
The three clusters on Fenda are:
• CL.1 (33%): Frequent price up and down. 687 users (76%
are experts) who have a high price change frequency. Price
up and down are almost equally frequent.
• CL.2 (43%): Rarely changing price. 908 users (76% are
experts) who rarely change their price.
• CL.3 (24%): Frequent price up. 499 users (74% are experts)
who increase price frequently but rarely lower their price.
We find that the 3 types of pricing patterns on Fenda corre-
spond to users of different popularity. As shown in Table 7,
cluster 1 represents the least popular answerers, who have
the least followers and listeners but answered more questions.
These users constantly adjust their price, possibly to test the
market. Cluster 3 represents the most popular experts and
celebrities. They charge higher than others and keep increas-
ing the price. Cluster 2 stands between cluster 1 and 3 in terms
of popularity, and its users rarely change the price.
Whale’s 3 clusters only contain 68 users in total. We include
the results for completeness:
• CL.1 (60%): Rarely changing price. 41 users (32% are ex-
perts) with the least frequent price change.
• CL.2 (22%): Frequent price up and down. 15 users (87%
are experts) who frequently change/drop the price.
• CL.3 (18%): Occasional price up and down. 12 users (92%
are experts) who occasionally change the price.
As shown in Table 7, Whale’s cluster 3 contains the most pop-
ular users, followed by cluster 1 and 2. Figure 12(b) “Price
Metrics Fenda Whale
CL.1 CL.2 CL.3 CL.1 CL.2 CL.3
Avg. #Followers 627.6 749.5 951.4 508.7 1358.1 1687.1
Avg. #Listeners 16.6 27.0 25.9 43.5 68.1 62.6
Avg. Price ($) 1.7 2.4 2.6 0.2 1.3 0.7
Avg. #Questions 106.5 68.8 71.4 41.6 17.7 112.4
Table 7. User statistics of the identified clusters for Fenda and Whale.
Up-Down” shows the most popular users of cluster 3 are rel-
atively balanced in terms of increasing versus decreasing the
price. The less popular users of cluster 1 and 2 are more lean-
ing towards decreasing the price. Compared to Fenda, all the
clusters of Whale adjust their price rather frequently. This
shows that popular users on Fenda already have the luxury
to keep increasing the price. On Whale, even the most popu-
lar users are frequently adjusting their price, possibly due to
the limited earning opportunities (a much lower payment per
question).
Impact to User Engagement
Next, we analyze how price adjustments affect a user’s
engagement-level over time. Price is a key parameter within
users’ control, and adjusting price is a way to test their an-
swers’ value in the market. Intuitively, this price can affect
a user’s incoming questions, earnings and social interactions,
which are key incentive factors to keep users engaged.
Fenda. Figure 13(a) shows the interplay between price
change and engagement level over time for 3 identified clus-
ters on Fenda. We quantify engagement-level using number
of answers per day. To measure changes over time, we divide
a user’s lifespan (time between her first and last answer in our
dataset) into two even parts. Then we compute the differences
for average price and engagement-level between the later half
and first half. In a similar way, we also measure the changes
in income (Figure 13(b)) and listeners (Figure 13(c)), which
represent the strength of monetary and social incentives
We observe different patterns: for cluster 2 and 3, more users
are located in the lower right corner than upper right, indi-
cating a decrease of engagement, income and number of lis-
teners. A possible explanation is that there is a mismatch be-
tween the answer’s price and its value, but users did not make
the right adjustments. In contrast, we find a significant num-
ber of users in cluster 1 located in the upper left corner. By
lowering their price, these users get to answer more ques-
tions, and receive more money and listeners over time. We
validate the statistical significance of the results by calculat-
ing the Pearson correlation [31] between the price change (x)
and behavior metrics (y) for all three clusters in Figure 13.We
find 8/9 of the correlations are significant (p < 0.05) except
for cluster1’s income/day metric.
Our result suggests that users need to set their price carefully
to match their market value. This requires proactive price ad-
justments and lowering their price when necessary. Right now,
highly popular users on Fenda (e.g., cluster 3) are less moti-
vated or unwilling to lower their price, which in turn hurts
their income and engagement level over time.
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Figure 13. The impact of pricing strategy to user engagement, income, and listeners over time in Fenda. We divide a user’s lifespan in our dataset into
two even parts, and compute the difference between the later half and the first half. A positive value indicates an upward trend (better viewed in color).
Whale. We performed the same analysis on Whale and found
none of the correlationswere statistically significant (possibly
due to the small sample size).
DISCUSSION
Our analysis shows both positive impacts of monetary incen-
tives and some concerning issues in the long run. Below, we
discuss the key implications to future CQA design.
First, Answering On-demand. Fenda and Whale adopt a
supplier-driven model where experts set a price for their an-
swer. This model is suitable for targeted questions (users
know who to ask), but can have a longer delay compared to
crowdsourcing (where anyone can be a potential answerer).
Fenda and Whale achieve faster responses than most CQA
services, but are still not as fast as the crowdsourcing based
Yahoo Answers. Recently, Fenda added a new crowdsourc-
ing channel for “medical” and “legal” questions. This chan-
nel is customer-driven: users post their questions with a cash
reward, and any experts can give their answers to compete
for the reward. We did a quick crawling on the crowdsourc-
ing channel and obtained 1344 questions. We find their aver-
age response time is 4.38 hours, which is even faster than the
8.25 hours of Yahoo Answers (Table 4). A promising future
direction is to explore a hybrid design of customer-driven and
supplier-driven model to further improve CQA efficiency.
Second, Rewarding Good Questions. Fenda and Whale are
the first systems that reward users financially for asking good
questions. This leads to a mixed effect. On the positive side,
users are motivated to ask good questions that attract broad in-
terests. 40% of the questions on Fenda received enough listen-
ers to cover the asker’s cost. Whale, however, is less success-
ful in profiting the askers due to the “free coin” design. On the
negative side, this model motivates a small number of users to
game the system for profits.We find “bounty hunters” who ag-
gressively ask questions to low-priced experts, and “collusive”
users who work together to manipulate their perceived popu-
larity. Note that this is different from the traditional cheat-
ing behavior in crowdsourcing platforms like MTurk, where
cheaters often produce low-quality work [5]. In Fenda and
Whale, manipulators mainly introduce unfairness, but they
still need to come up with good questions to attract listeners.
Finally, Unfairness in Supplier-driven Markets. In a supplier-
driven marketplace, a well-known expert has the key advan-
tage to receive questions. As a result, the financial income
among answerers is highly uneven: top 5% answerers get
about 90% of the total profits in Fenda. To attract ques-
tions, we find that less popular users need to carefully adjust
their price (including dropping the price), while more popular
users tend to increase their price. To help users to bootstrap
popularity, Fenda recently introduced a system update, which
allows users to set their answers “free-for-listening” for 30
minutes after posting.
FUTURE WORK AND LIMITATIONS
Fenda andWhale are among the recent wave of CQA systems
that explore a new design space for payment-based knowl-
edge sharing communities. They not only provide valuable
lessons for other services, but also raise new questions.
Communication Mechanisms for CQA. Fenda and Whale let
users record their answers in audio/video to avoid the incon-
venience of typing text on the phone. Audio/video is likely to
provide a more intimate experience for users, which, however,
also makes it difficult to give longer answers. Future research
may examine the proper communication channels (text, au-
dio, video) for different Q&A contexts. Noticeably, real-time
streaming can be a promising option for CQA, given the huge
success of Periscope and Facebook Live [36].
Preventing Abuse and Manipulation. Abusive activities are
likely to be a common problem for payment-based CQA
given that money is the incentive. Our work provides a first
look (empirically) at the bounty hunters and collusive users in
Fenda and Whale. Future research is needed to develop more
systematic approaches to detect abusive players and design
new incentive models to prevent/limit abuse.
Study Limitations. Our study has a few limitations. First,
our study only focuses on two services: Fenda and Whale. A
broader comparison with other payment-based CQA services
can help to further generalize our results. Second, our dataset
is not perfect. The crawler produces a dataset with a complete
list of experts but an incomplete list of normal users.We argue
that most of the missing users are likely lurkers (or inactive
users) who are less influential in the community.We also used
Fenda’s official numbers to justify parts of our results. Finally,
Fenda and Whale are still exploring its way to building a sus-
tainable CQA marketplace. It made a few changes before our
paper submission as discussed above. We plan to continue to
monitor these systems for future work.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discuss lessons learned from the first
supplier-driven payment-based CQA systems. By analyzing
a large empirical dataset, we reveal the benefits of apply-
ing monetary incentives to CQA systems (fast response,
high-quality questions) as well as potential concerns (bounty
hunters and over time engagement). As more payment-based
CQA systems arise (Campfire.fm, Quora Knowledge Prize,
Zhihu Live), our research results can help system designers
to make more informed design choices.
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